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IsFederal Court Oversight of the
Arizona ELL Public School
Program No Longer Necessary?
by Paul M. Secunda
PREVIEWi of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 430-434. © 2009 American Bar Association.
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For the past nine years,
the defendants and plaintiffs in this case have
fought over how the State
of Arizona should go
about taking "appropriate
action" to cure its
violation of the
Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of
1974 (EEOA). The state
and the mother of a
minority student in the
English language learner
(ELL) program of the
Nogales Unified School
District disagree fundamentally on not only the
appropriate model for
ELL education, but also

ISSUES
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the state defendants' Rule 60(b)(5) motion, which
would have dissolved its orders
requiring Arizona to provide an
appropriate program for English
Language Learner (ELL) students in
the Nogales Unified School District
(NUSD)?

on the amount of funding
it would take to cure the
defects in the program.
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Does the state testing and accountability plan that was approved by
the Secretary of Education as a condition for funding under the No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) statute
automatically satisfy the requirement under the Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA),

20 U.S.C. § 1703(f), to "take appropriate action" to overcome language
barriers that impede participation in
instructional programs?
FACTS
Home v. Flores started all the way
back in 1992, when the mother of
Miriam Flores, a minority student in
the English language learner (ELL)
program of the Nogales Unified
School District (NUSD), filed a
class action against the State
Superintendent for Education, the
State Board of Education, and the
State of Arizona (collectively
"defendants"). Plaintiffs sought
declaratory relief, alleging the NUSD
(a district in southwestern Arizona
along the Mexican border) was "failing to provide [ELL] children with a
program of instruction calculated to
make them proficient in speaking,
understanding, reading, and writing
English, while enabling them to
master the standard academic curriculum as required of all students."

HORNE V. FLORES ET AL.
AND
SPEAKER OF THE ARZONA HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ET AL. V
FLORES ET AL.
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After eight years of litigation, the federal district court in Arizona entered
declaratory relief, finding that the
State of Arizona was in violation of
§ 1703(f) of the EEOA. That section
of the EEOA provides that "[n]o
State shall deny equal educational
opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex,
or national origin" by "the failure by
an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs." The EEOA provides
individuals with an express private
right of action and authorizes courts
to grant "such relief, as may be
appropriate" for failures to take
appropriate action. Relying on Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), which
held that the failure to provide
English instruction to non-Englishspeaking students denies them "a
meaningful opportunity to participate in" public education, the district court found that the state's system of ELL programs, which appropriated only $150 for each nonEnglish speaking student, was "arbitrary and capricious and bears no
relation to the actual funding needed
to ensure that [ELL] students in
[Nogales] are achieving mastery of
its specified 'essential skills."' The
state was thereafter put under federal court remedial oversight until it
took "appropriate action" to cure the
statutory violation.
Over the next nine years, the defendants and plaintiffs in this case have
fought over how the state should go
about taking "appropriate action" to
cure its violation of the EEOA. The
parties disagree fundamentally on
not only the appropriate model for
ELLeducation, but also on the
amount of funding it would take to
cure the defects in the program. For
instance, at one point in 2005, the
district court became so frustrated
with Arizona's inability to increase
funding for its ELL programs that it

found the state in contempt and
fined it $500,000 per day until the
state complied with its order.
The defendant state superintendent
and state legislative intervenors
eventually sought Rule 60(b)(5)
relief to end federal court oversight
of its ELL program on the ground
that compliance with the objectives
of § 1703(f) had been achieved as a
result of changed circumstances in
the provision of ELL programs to
the certified class of minority children in NUSD. (Interestingly, the
defendant state and the defendant
Board of Education did not join this
motion.) Rule 60(b)(5) allows relief
from federal court oversight where
"the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged ...or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application." U.S. Supreme Court case law
has emphasized in this context that,
"it is appropriate to grant a Rule
60(b)(5) motion when the party
seeking relief from an injunction or
consent decree can show a significant change either in fact or in
law." Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 215 (1997).
The state defendants maintain that
although they have never reached
close to the funding levels envisioned by the court, they have taken appropriate action in other ways,
including by improving ELL test
scores, providing better training for
teachers, and providing more individual assistance to ELL students.
More specifically, the defendants
claim that, "[slubstantial legal and
factual changes occurred [from
2000-20071, including a change in
the ELL program to Structured
English Immersion, funding increases, compliance with federal standards under [No Child Left Behind]
NCLB, better management, and
increased oversight." Indeed,
Arizona Proposition 203 now
requires ELL students to be taught

through structured English immersion (SEI) strategies so that all ELL
students are placed in English language classrooms and taught in
English.' The defendants point out
that SEI instruction (rather than
bilingual or ESL instruction) is now
offered in small groups at the elementary schools and that small selfcontained ELD classes are provided
at both the middle schools and high
school. Defendants argue that the
new SEI program, substantial state
support for that program, and
changes within NUSD, remedied the
deficiencies in its ELL program that
were identified in the original 2000
order. In short, defendants believe
that ELL programs in NUSD are now
reasonably calculated to permit ELL
students to learn English and
advance academically and that federal court oversight is no longer
necessary.
Defendants also place weight on the
changed educational circumstances
in the wake of the passage of the No
Child Left Behind Act (NLCB) in
2002, two years after the initial
Flores remedial order. ELL students
are a specifically defined NCLB subgroup and must meet annual measurable achievement objectives for
both academic annual yearly
progress (AYP) goals and progress
toward attainment of English proficiency. The defendants maintain
that because NCLB requires that
Arizona's school meet certain minimal standards with regard to ELL
learners, and Arizona has met those
standards, the more rigorous standards of the 2000 order have been
superseded by NCLB standards.
The district court disagreed with the
defendants, finding that the state
funding for ELL programs bore no
relation to the costs of an appropriate program. Specifically, applying
the standard set forth in Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502
U.S. 367 (1992), the court found no
(Continued on Page 432)
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"changed circumstances that would
warrant modification or dissolution
of this Court's order." The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that Rule
60(b)(5) relief could only be
achieved if Arizona funded ELL programs from a designated source of
funds that could cover the incremental costs of ELL education in
coming years. Flores v. Arizona,
516 F.3d 1140, 1171 (9th Cir.
2008). The Ninth Circuit further
found that because the EEOA and
NCLB had disparate purposes,
Arizona's compliance with the
requirements of NCLB was irrelevant to the issue of whether Arizona
had taken "appropriate action"
under the EEOA.
CASE ANALYSIS
In Home v. Flores, the defendant
state superintendent and the state
legislative intervenors appeal the
Ninth Circuit finding, maintaining
that compliance with Section
1703(0 of the EEOA should not be
all about educational funding, but
also should be about how the state
is now performing in providing ELL
programs to the NUSD public school
students in toto. (In a procedural
move, the plaintiffs have challenged
whether the Ninth Circuit had the
authority to hear the challenge to
the denial of the Rule 60(b)(5)
motion, since the defendant state
and defendant state board of education did not join that appeal.)
The defendants argue that what matters for EEOA purposes is whether
there is adequate programming, not
whether there is funding from a particular source. In their petition for
certiorari, the defendants exhaustively lay out a multitude of funding
improvements, program improvements, and student successes to support their view that "appropriate
action" should be based on funding
and oversight concerns combined,
and not funding alone. As a result,
defendants write in their petition for

certiorari, by 2007, "NUSD's students engaged in a coherent program of instruction, were overcoming language barriers, and advancing
academically. The purpose of
§ 1703(0 had been fulfilled."
Plaintiffs counter that a universally
accepted standard exists for determining what "appropriate action"
means under the EEOA. In
Castanedav. Pickard,648 F.2d 989
(5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit
held that "appropriate action" consists of three elements: (1) the
school system must select a sound
educational theory; (2) it must "follow through with practices,
resources and personnel necessary
to transform the theory into reality," and (3) the programs must
"produce results indicating that the
language barriers confronting students are actually being overcome."
The plaintiffs maintain that the
defendants had failed to satisfy the
second Castaneda prong because it
did not "follow through" with sufficient "practices, resources, and personnel" to implement its chosen
instructional methods. Specifically,
and agreeing with the Ninth Circuit
in this regard, plaintiffs point to the
fact that resource constraints have
resulted in "persistent achievement
gaps" between ELL students and
other students in Nogales, that
resource constraints caused ongoing, serious programmatic deficiencies in teachers, tutors, teacher
aides, and class size, and that the
record thus did not "call into serious question [Nogales's] need for
increased incremental funds." In
short, plaintiffs agree that the district court acted within its discretion in declining to dissolve its
orders in the absence of sound evidence of material and sustainable
change to the NUSD ELL program.
In bolstering their argument that
the Ninth Circuit improperly denied
Rule 60(b)(5) relief, defendants

advance additional legal arguments.
First, based on notions of federalism, they argue that state and local
authorities should be permitted to
manage their own affairs once the
federal statutory violation has been
cured, even if cure of that defect
has not occurred in the manner
contemplated by the federal court.
Second, and connected to their federalism argument, defendants argue
that state and local authorities are
entitled to discretion in deciding
how to cure a federal violation.
Plaintiffs respond to this federalism
argument by asserting that the district court acted in a limited remedial manner in dealing with the
statutory violation. Specifically, the
plaintiffs assert in their brief to the
Supreme Court that the district
court never directed the state to
implement any particular ELL programs, never directed the state to
adopt a particular method for determining the costs of an appropriate
ELL program, and never ordered
the state to adopt any particular
funding model for ELL programs or
to spend any particular amount of
money on ELL programs. Instead,
plaintiffs argue, the district court
only ordered that Arizona ensure
that funding bear a nonarbitrary
relationship to the actual costs of an
appropriate ELL program. In short,
plaintiffs maintain that the court's
remedial approach is consistent
with the Supreme Court's standards
in Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
88 (1995).
Finally, the Supreme Court must
decide if the meaning of the EEOA,
passed in 1974, may be defined by
the subsequent passage of the
NCLB. This question turns on
whether the Court believes that the
NCLB is more specific legislation
addressing the same subject matter
as the EEOA.
The defendants argue that the
enactment of NCLB has brought
Issue No. 7 Volume 36

about significant changes to the
manner in which ELL students are
being taught nationwide and say
that as a result, ELL students are
now provided equal education
opportunities by the State of
Arizona as required under the
EEOA. This fact, they argue, is
therefore not irrelevant, as the
Ninth Circuit held. Because NCLB
sets forth specific requirements to
ensure that school districts are held
accountable to effectively teach ELL
students, those specific requirements define the meaning of
"appropriate action" under EEOA
§ 1703(f). In this regard, defendants
argue that the NCLB contains more
specific guidelines for the implementation of adequate ELL programs to satisfy both its and the
EEOA's identical goals of ensuring
that there are effective ELL programs. In short, to the defendants,
the NCLB fleshes out the EEOA to
ensure that ELL students "overcome language barriers" so they can
"participate in instructional programs." And because Arizona has
met its NCLB requirements, it follows that it has met its EEOA obligations; it would be illogical, defendants maintain, for the plaintiffs to
claim that Arizona can simultaneously comply with the stringent
requirements of NCLB and still
violate the vague requirement of
§ 1703(f) to "take appropriate
action."

As to defendants' NCLB argument,
plaintiffs point out that the NCLB
did not amend or replace the EEOA.
Instead, they assert, Congress
enacted a savings clause prescribing
that "[niothing in [NCLBJ shall be
construed in a manner inconsistent
with any federal law guaranteeing a
civil right." 20 U.S.C. § 6847.
Moreover, plaintiffs maintain in
their brief that, "[hiad Congress
intended for approval of an NCLB
plan to establish compliance with
the EEOA, Congress would have

said so explicitly, particularly given
that the Secretary's approval of an
NCLB plan involves no substantive
review of the adequacy of the State's
ELL programs. And whereas the
EEOA imposes mandatory duties on
all states and provides for private
actions resulting in judicial remedies, NCLB involves duties voluntarily assumed by states and provides
for enforcement by administrative
action alone." These differences
mean that the defendants' NCLB
arguments are far-fetched and that
"there is no basis for inferring an
implicit intention by Congress that
a state's possession of an approved
NCLB plan-which every state now
possesses-would somehow automatically establish compliance with
the EEOA."
Plaintiffs also agree with the Ninth
Circuit that the purposes of the two
statutes are different. Whereas the
NCLB is about a "general plan gradually to improve overall performance" of schools, § 1703(f) of the
EEOA is an "equality-based civil
rights statute" designed to deal with
the immediate rights of ELL students. Consequently, the NCLB is
irrelevant for purposes of interpreting the EEOA because it is not more
specific legislation addressing the
same subject matter as the EEOA.
Indeed, if the NCLB were read as a
gloss on the EEOA and the accountability and performance standards
were met in any given year by a
school district, the plaintiffs believe
this state of affairs would lead to a
repeal of the EEOA by implication
and, as the Ninth Circuit characterized this situation, enforcement
rights under § 1703(f) would "wink
in and out of existence."
SIGNIFICANCE
Although predicting Supreme Court
cases is like reading tea leaves, this
case may have little to do with the
relationship between the ELL provisions of the NCLB and the EEOA.

The statutes do appear to be differentially focused and there is no congressional indication that the latter
NCLB was supposed to amend the
EEOA. On the other hand, Home v.
Flores is more likely to have everything to do with whether the
Supreme Court believes that the
district court has exercised appropriate, limited remedial oversight in
this case. That means that this case
will likely come down to a discussion over the scope of federalism
and whether the various federalcourt decrees exceeded their appropriate limited scope by forcing
Arizona to adopt specific remedial
actions to cure the EEOA violation.
In all, Home v. Flores is not merely
an education law case. It has parts
that concern the proper equitable
powers of federal courts in institutional reform litigation, the proper
relationship between federal and
state government in making funding
decisions concerning the rights of
historically disadvantaged groups,
and the relationship between two
educational statutes passed more
than 25 years apart and touching
upon the improvement of education
opportunities for ELL students. And
what perhaps makes this case most
compelling of all is that it takes
place within the larger debate of
how the states and federal government should deal with illegal immigration over this country's borders
and what is to be done with the education of such immigrants' children.
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